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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a novel experiment designed to examine how rent dissipation may occur in 
fisheries in which the right to participate in the fishery is limited and fishermen compete amongst 
themselves for shares of an exogenous total allowable catch.  We demonstrate that rent 
dissipation may occur through multiple mechanisms, and that the heterogeneity of fishermen has 
important implications for how rent dissipation occurs and the extent to which different 
individuals may benefit from the implementation of rights-based management.  We apply this 
approach to investigate the concept of voluntary rights-based management under which 
managers divide the total allowable catch between two separate fisheries, and fishermen may 
choose between fishing for a guaranteed individual harvest quota or competing for a share of the 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than fifty years ago, H. Scott Gordon (1954) described the problem of rent dissipation in 
fisheries in which fishermen do not have clear rights to the fish they catch.  This absence of well-
defined property rights can lead to excess investment in inputs which dissipates potential rents 
from fishing.  Since then economists have extensively examined and documented fisheries rent 
dissipation, expanded the understanding of its causes and extent, and proposed a wide variety of 
regulatory approaches to addressing it (Wilen 2004; Homans and Wilen 2005).   Many of these 
approaches are based on the creation of individual property rights to harvest shares of the total 
allowable catch. 
  This paper describes a novel experiment designed to examine how rent dissipation may 
occur in fisheries in which the right to participate in the fishery is limited and fishermen compete 
amongst themselves for shares of an exogenous total allowable catch.  We demonstrate that rent 
dissipation may occur through multiple mechanisms, and that the heterogeneity of fishermen has 
important implications for how rent dissipation occurs and the extent to which different 
individuals may benefit from the implementation of rights-based management.  We apply this 
approach to investigate the concept of voluntary rights-based management under which 
managers divide the total allowable catch between two separate fisheries, and fishermen may 
choose between fishing for a guaranteed individual harvest quota or competing for a share of the 
total catch in a competitive fishery. 
  2 
Mechanisms of Rent Dissipation in Fisheries 
It is important to distinguish between three different mechanisms of rent dissipation in fisheries, 
all of which derive from lack of clear rights to fish, but which differ in the extent to which they 
are addressed by regulatory policies.    
Resource-driven.  Without clear rights to fishery resources, individual fishermen do not 
receive the full benefits to society that derive from foregoing current harvests.  As a result, they 
may harvest too many fish in the short run, resulting in lower long-term biomass levels, harvests 
and rents. Resource-driven rent dissipation—Hardin’s much-cited “Tragedy of the Commons” 
(1968)—has received the greatest attention from environmentalists, the public and regulators—
some of whom perceive it to be the only problem of fisheries management.   
Cost-driven.  Even if managers successfully address the problem of resource-driven 
overfishing by limiting total harvests, without resource rights fishermen seeking to capture 
resource rents will tend to use higher-than-optimal inputs that lead to higher-than-optimal costs.  
As described by Wilen (2004) “…the rent generation capacity of the natural resource will be 
squandered.  By attracting too many inputs…the output produced will not generate any surplus 
returns. . . As a result, we witness the paradoxical situation of a system with reasonably healthy 
biological resources producing virtually zero or even negative economic returns.”  Cost-driven 
rent dissipation may take a variety of forms, such as overcapitalization, gear loss, and 
interference of vessels in each other’s fishing operations. 
Value-driven.  Recently economists have recognized a third type of rent dissipation 
driven by the more subtle mechanism of the failure of fisheries without rights to capture the full 
market value potential of fish.  As described by Homans and Wilen (2005) “the character of 
modern fisheries on both its market and production side is heavily influenced by the nature of  3 
regulations and the manner in which these unfold over time.  Importantly, regulations are 
influenced by, and have impacts on, product attributes and quality…Rent dissipation and 
distortions on the marketing side of the ledger may be as important as distortions on the 
production or cost side of the ledger.”  After individual transferable quota were implemented in 
the British Columbia halibut fishery, ex vessel prices increased over 50% in the first few years 
as the market for fresh halibut expanded. Similar price increases after quota implementation 
were observed in the Australian southern bluefin tuna and south Atlantic wreckfish fisheries 
(Homans and Wilen 2005). 
This paper is motivated by the competitive—or derby—salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay, 
Alaska.  Harvesting in the fishery is limited to a fixed number of permit holders. These permits 
only convey the right to participate in the fishery, they do not allocate individual property rights 
to a particular quantity or share of total allowable catch. In Bristol Bay and other Alaska 
salmon fisheries, the resource-driven problem of problem of overharvesting has been addressed 
by limits on when permit holders may fish.  Fishery managers “close” fishing periodically to 
ensure that sufficient returning salmon “escape” the commercial harvest to enter their rivers of 
origin to spawn.  In limited entry fisheries for other species, the aggregate harvest is capped at a 
total allowable catch (TAC) determined by fishery managers based on annual biomass 
projections, and managers close the fishery once this TAC is reached. 
 In these competitive limited entry fisheries, although the resource may be protected by 
limits on when fishermen may fish or how much they can catch, the absence of clearly defined 
rights to shares of the harvest can still lead to cost-driven and value-driven rent dissipation 
through both overcapitalization and a highly competitive, derby-style “race for fish.” 
(Fishermen and managers use the term “derby” to describe intensely competitive fisheries in  4 
which fishermen fish aggressively to harvest the total allowable catch in a short period of time).  
The focus of this paper is on these latter two mechanisms of rent-dissipation.  In particular, we 
seek to understand how and why input choices and fishing behavior of heterogeneous 
fishermen affect individual and aggregate costs and value—and in turn the extent of individual 
and aggregate benefits from adoption of rights-based management. 
 
Overview of Experiment 
Our experiment is intended to parallel—in a simple way—physically harvesting fish under 
different management regimes.  The “fish” were beans in a large common bowl on a table.  For 
fishing “gear,” subjects used metal kitchen measuring cups, or “scoops,” to harvest beans from 
the bowl into plastic pitchers on the floor. Subjects harvested under three different management 
regimes or treatments.  The Skill treatment was intended to test for heterogeneity among subjects 
in their harvesting skill in a competitive fishery.  In this treatment, eight subjects harvested 
simultaneously from one bowl using identically sized scoops until all the beans were harvested.  
Individual earnings were proportional to the amount beans harvested.  We observe wide 
differences in individual harvests, which are highly correlated across successive fishing 
“seasons” (experiment rounds).  
  The Derby treatment was intended to mimic conditions in a fishery in which both the 
total catch and the right to participate in the fishery is limited, but fishermen compete among 
themselves for shares of the total catch.  Eight subjects harvested simultaneously from one bowl.  
Immediately prior to each round, subjects had to choose one of seven scoops with which to 
harvest, ranging in size from 1/8 cup to 1 cup.  As in the Skill treatment, subjects were paid a 
fixed price that was proportional to their individual harvest, but they also had to pay a rental cost  5 
for their scoops that was proportional to the scoop’s size.  Costs would be minimized and rents 
maximized if all subjects chose the least-cost 1/8 cup scoop. 
  Fishing under these rules, subjects regularly exhibited competitive behavior characteristic 
of a classic derby fishery.  Not surprisingly, they chose scoop sizes much larger than 1/8 cup, 
realizing (correctly) that those with larger scoops capture a much larger share of the harvest. This 
added to total costs without adding to total revenues, resulting in cost-driven rent dissipation.  
An unanticipated and interesting result of the experiment is that in harvesting aggressively to 
scoop beans out of the bowl and toss them into their pitchers as fast as they could, subjects 
spilled a significant share of the total harvest onto the floor rather than successfully transferring 
the beans to their pitchers.  This is an example of value-driven rent dissipation because the value 
subjects received for the beans they harvest from the bowl was less than the full potential value 
they would have received had they handled their harvested beans more carefully. 
Thus, as a result of the combined effects of cost-driven and value-driven rent dissipation, 
a large share of the potential profits in the Derby treatment were dissipated (92%), and most 
subjects earned little or no profits.  Importantly, subjects’ scoop choices and catches in the Derby 
are correlated with their “skill” as measured in the Skill treatment, suggesting that heterogeneity 
in skill affects individual subjects’ gear use, catches, profits, and aggregate rent dissipation in the 
derby fishery.  
After subjects experienced the competitive derby fishery for multiple rounds, in 
subsequent Individual Harvest Quota (IHQ) treatments they were given the option to switch to an 
individual quota fishery, in which each subject received an individual quota that he could harvest 
at his own pace. For those subjects who chose the IHQ fishery, the change in behavior was 
dramatic. They harvested slowly and carefully using the efficient lowest-cost 1/8 cup scoop, and  6 
spilled almost no beans.  Thus the experiment demonstrates—quite dramatically—the predicted 
result that competitive fishing leads to rent dissipation, and quota-based management ends this 
rent dissipation. Although this result is well-known, the experiment provides a particularly 
effective way of demonstrating it using a unique design.    
The focus of the remainder of this paper is on research applications of the experiment:  to 
examine implications of heterogeneity in competitive fisheries, and to examine factors 
influencing subjects’ choices over time between the option to fish competitively or for a 
guaranteed individual quota.  In addition, the experimental approach also has great potential for 
teaching and demonstration applications. 
 
Voluntary Transition to Rights-Based Management 
By addressing the fundamental causes of rent dissipation, rights-based fisheries management 
offers significant potential economic advantages over competitive fisheries.  Various approaches 
to rights-based management have been implemented in numerous fisheries worldwide.  One 
form is individual fishing quotas (IFQs), under which governments allocate rights to individuals 
to harvest shares of the total allowable catch (TAC).  Another approach is for governments to 
allocate rights to all or part of the TAC to harvester cooperatives, which may then allocate 
harvesting rights among their own members (Townsend et al., 2008).  Despite potential 
advantages of rights-based management over competitive fisheries, there is often significant 
resistance to rights-based management from many fishermen (e.g., Grader, 2002).  This 
resistance has slowed or stopped the adoption of rights-based management in many fisheries.  
For example, opposition from fishermen led to a Congressional moratorium on the establishment 
of new individual quota systems in U.S. federally managed fisheries between 1996 and 2002.  7 
Fishermen may oppose rights-based management for many reasons.  These include but are not 
limited to: 
  they may not understand the reasons for which economists believe rights-based 
management would make them better off; 
  they may doubt that rights-based management will work in practice like economists think 
it will; 
  they proposed method of allocation of rights may reduce their expected future catches 
and profits; 
  if they are risk-seeking, they may prefer the chance to strike it big with a highly 
profitable season to a lower guaranteed catch in a rights-based fishery; 
  they may enjoy fishing competitively. 
Voluntary transition to rights-based management may help to overcome political resistance to 
rights-based management by addressing these concerns.  It provides an opportunity to 
demonstrate the benefits of rights-based management for those who do not understand the 
concept or doubt that it will work as intended.  It provides an opportunity for fishermen who 
prefer to fish competitively to continue to do so.
1 In this paper, we apply our experimental 
methodology to examine the following approach to voluntary transition to rights-based 
management:  
  Entry to the fishery is limited so that new entrants are not attracted as rents increase. 
                                                 
1 We do not argue that voluntary transition addresses all of the reasons for which fishermen may oppose rights-
based management.  Examples of reasons for which fishermen may oppose rights-based management which would 
not be addressed by voluntary transition include loss of employment opportunities for crew as fleets consolidate; 
increased cost of entry to the fishery for young people who do not receive initial allocations of quota; decline in 
return to competitive fishing skills such as the ability to fish continuously without resting; and effects on fishing 
communities due to changes in the geographical distribution of where fish are landed, where fish are processed, and 
where fishermen live.  Thus we do not argue that rights-based management is a panacea that will smooth all 
objections to rights-based management, but rather that it may be a practical method of addressing some concerns 
and capturing some of the potential benefits of rights-based management.   
  8 
  The total quota is allocated between two separate fisheries:  a rights-based fishery, in 
which harvesters fish for equal individual shares of the total rights-based quota, and a 
competitive derby fishery, in which harvesters compete for the total competitive quota. 
The two fisheries may be divided temporally (fishing occurs at different times), spatially 
(fishing occurs in different areas), or in some other way. 
  Harvesters may choose annually whether to participate in the rights-based fishery or the 
competitive fishery. 
  The annual allocation of the aggregate quotas between the two fisheries depends upon the 
number of harvesters choosing to participate in each fishery. 
  The average allocation per harvester is greater for the competitive fishery than for the 
rights-based fishery. 
The rationale for this approach is as follows. The new rights-based fishery generates higher rents 
per fish than the original competitive fishery. Thus, even if those harvesters who choose the 
rights-based fishery are given a lower average allocation of fish than their average harvests in the 
original fishery, they can earn higher rents per fish—giving them an incentive to choose the 
rights-based fishery. But by giving the rights-based fishery a lower per capita allocation, 
harvesters who choose the competitive fishery can be given a higher average allocation than 
average catches in the original fishery—potentially making them also better off.
2  Thus both the 
fishermen that prefer a rights-based fishery and those who prefer a competitive fishery can be 
potentially made better off —a “win-win” opportunity that gives both groups an incentive to 
support the change from a fully competitive fishery. 
                                                 
2 Whether they are in fact better off depends on what their aggregate catch share would have been in the original 
fully competitive fishery.    9 
  This approach to voluntary transition is similar to that which was adopted in the Alaska 
Chignik salmon fishery between 2002 and 2005.  The Chignik salmon fishery is a major Alaska 
sockeye salmon fishery with approximately 100 limited entry permit holders.  Permit holders 
recognized the potential for substantial cost savings from a harvesting co-op which would 
harvest the fish using a much smaller number of boats and share the profits among permit 
holders.  However, advocates of a harvesting co-op were unable to gain a consensus among 
permit holders as to how the profits would be distributed.  To overcome this impasse, in 2002 a 
group of permit holders asked the Alaska Board of Fisheries to allocate part of the Chignik 
sockeye harvest to a voluntary harvesting cooperative.  The size of the allocation would depend 
upon how many permit holders chose to join the Co-op.  Other permit holders could harvest the 
remaining fish in a traditional competitive derby fishery that would receive the remaining 
allocation of the sockeye harvest.  The co-op fishery and competitive fisheries would be 
conducted sequentially, alternating fishing opportunities over the course of the salmon season. 
(Knapp 2008). 
The Board of Fisheries granted the allocation and over the following four years (2002-
2005) more than three-quarters of Chignik permit holders joined the co-op.  The co-op hired 
about 20 members to fish the Co-op’s catch allocation.  All co-op members were paid equal 
shares of the co-op’s profits.  By greatly reducing the number of vessels participating in the 
fishery, the co-op achieved very significant cost savings, while also implementing a variety of 
quality improvements.  The Chignik co-op , which ended after four seasons because the Alaska 
Supreme Court found that it was inconsistent with Alaska’s limited entry law, clearly 
demonstrated the potential of rights-based management to generate substantially higher salmon 
rents in an Alaska salmon fishery.  Perhaps more importantly, however, it demonstrated the  10 
potential for a voluntary approach to rights-based management to facilitate the implementation of 
rights-based management.  It is almost certain that the Board of Fisheries would not have 
approved the creation of a mandatory co-op.    
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Many social dilemma experiments with nonlinear payoff functions, such as most common-pool 
resource and some public goods experiments, give subjects a large payoff table that presents 
individual earnings as a function of the subject’s own choice and those of the fellow group 
members.
3  To examine the concept of a voluntary transition to rights-based management, rather 
than use payoff tables, a unique feature of these experiments is that subjects actively participated 
in an actual harvesting activity—scooping beans from a large bowl. 
The rationale behind using this hands-on approach was to have not only the decisions, but 
also the actions, of the experiments be more natural and more closely parallel those in the 
fisheries that motivate the research.  The use of a payoff table detailing all the possible choices 
and outcomes may be too abstract for some subjects, even when the game is framed in non-
neutral language. Moreover, the payoff table masks the process through which the values arise 
and implies a particular approach for thinking about the problem and developing a decision-
making strategy.  Using the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004), this experiment would be 
classified as a framed field experiment in which we use a neutral frame, but the lab task is 
comparable to the field task under investigation. In essence, we bring the field into the lab. 
A total of 96 subjects were recruited from the general student population at the University 
of Alaska Anchorage. There were a total of four treatments, presented to subjects in one of three 
                                                 
3 There is a vast experimental literature that focuses on common pool resources and resource-drive rent dissipation, 
see Ostrom (2006) for a synthesis of some key lessons learned. For an example of a nonlinear public goods 
experiment see Isaac and Walker (1998)  11 
possible sequences.  Each sequence was implemented in four separate sessions, for a total of 12 
sessions with 8 subjects per session. We begin by first describing the treatments, and then we 
explain the sequences.  
 
Skill Treatment 
Every session, regardless of sequence, began with an unpaid practice round followed by three 
real money rounds in the Skill treatment. A group of n=8 subjects stood around a table with a 
large bowl containing a total of 20 cups of pinto beans (2.5 cups per person).  The harvesting 
technology was a ¼ cup stainless steel measuring cup referred to as a “harvesting scoop.”  
Subjects received a price of p=$1 for each cup of beans harvested from the common bowl into 
their individual pitchers, which were placed on the floor about three feet from the table.  There 
were no costs associated with harvesting in the Skill treatment. The restrictions imposed upon 
harvesting activities included: no intentional interference with the harvesting of others, no 
talking with the other participants, the scoop had to be held by the handle, and beans spilled on 
the floor could not be picked up. Harvesting was simultaneous and continued until all the beans 
were removed from the bowl.   
  After harvesting was completed, the beans in the pitchers were then delivered to the 
experimenter and results were tallied. For quicker and more accurate measurements, all 
deliveries were weighed and converted from grams to cups using the conversion ratio of 190 
grams of beans per cup.  Results were input into a spreadsheet that was displayed with a laptop 
projector for all to see. The public information included individual scoop sizes, deliveries, costs, 
and earnings.   12 
  The purpose of the Skill treatment was two-fold.  First, since all subjects were required to 
use the same ¼ cup harvesting scoop, any observed differences in individual deliveries may be 
attributable in part to unobserved individual characteristics, which we refer to as relative skill, 
which affect individual harvests in the same way across periods.  As discussed below, we use the 
Skill treatment to estimate subjects’ relative skill, which we then use in estimating a production 
function for deliveries in other treatments.  Second, pilot experiments suggested that our 
hypotheses about rent dissipation were likely to be supported in the Derby treatment described 
below.  In addition to providing data about relative skill, the Skill treatment also provided a 
salient way to increase earnings and maintain interest in the experiment. 
 
Derby Treatment 
After the Skill treatment, the rules for the Derby treatment were explained and were in effect for 
rounds 4-7 of each session.  The Derby treatment proceeded in much the same way as the Skill 
treatment with two exceptions. First, subjects were no longer required to use the ¼ cup 
harvesting scoop. Instead, each subject had his or her own complete set of seven stainless-steel 
measuring cups, referred to as “harvesting scoops,” ranging in size from 1/8 to 1 cup.  Each 
subject’s set of seven harvesting scoops was placed on the floor next to the pitcher. When period 
t began, each subject selected one scoop, xit, from his or her set to be used for harvesting during 
the entire round. Subjects could not switch scoops during a round, but could use a different scoop 
in subsequent rounds.  Second, harvesting was no longer costless.  As shown in Table 1, the 
rental cost, c(xit)=4.375xit, was a linear function of the individual’s harvesting scoop size. The 
cost was explained to subjects as follows:   13 
To pay for your harvesting scoop, we will subtract 4.375 scoops from your 
harvest using the same scoop that you used for harvesting.  This means that 
smaller harvesting scoops cost less, and larger harvesting scoops cost more.  The 
table here [a large poster on the wall] shows the cost of each harvesting scoop. 
This game is essentially a social dilemma with a nonlinear payoff function in which individuals 
are competing for a share of a fixed quantity of beans.  Suppose an individual’s quantity 
delivered, qit, is a function of his scoop size, xit, relative to the scoop size choices of the others, 
adjusted by a constant exogenous relative skill parameter, i, which reflects all individual 
characteristics that could affect harvesting by individual i, such as agility and motivation.  (Note 
that although we use the term “skill,” we cannot distinguish between physical ability to harvest 
beans quickly and the motivation to do so).  Under these assumptions, an individual’s earnings 















where Q=20 is the total quantity of beans in the bowl, p=$1, and  ( ) 4.375 it it cx x  .  Because the 
total revenue for the group, pQ, is fixed, aggregate earnings are maximized when costs are 
minimized, which occurs when each of the n=8 group members selects the smallest possible 
scoop, xit = 1/8 cup. In this case, average individual harvests would be Q/n = 2.5 cups, with a 
cost of 0.55 cups, and average earning of 1.95 cups at the social optimum.  For efficiency, the 
essential ingredient is that all subjects choose 1/8 cup. With heterogeneous subjects, variability 
in individual harvests and earnings is expected and has no impact on efficiency. 
  However, as in any social dilemma, this limited-entry or derby fishery creates a 
divergence between group and individual interests as people compete for the fixed pool of  14 
revenue (pQ=20).  If all subjects were homogeneous (i=1 for all i), then the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium would entail all subjects choosing a scoop such that: 
[2] 
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.   
In this case, average harvests would still be Q/n = 2.5 cups but average earnings would now be 
0.31, which is only 16% of the social optimum.   Put differently, if all subjects were 
homogeneous, we would expect most but not all rents to be dissipated.   
Our experiments show that people are not homogenous.  They make different cup choices 
and deliver different volumes even if they choose the same cup.  For our purposes, the key 
measures of rent dissipation are (a) whether all subjects chose the efficient 1/8 cup; (b) the 
quantity of beans that were spilled; and (c) whether individual earnings approached zero. 
 
Individual Harvest Quota Treatments (IHQ40 and IHQ80) 
At the start of each round in the two voluntary individual harvesting quota (IHQ) treatments, 
subjects were given the choice of harvesting in either the competitive derby (Bowl 1) or a quota 
fishery (Bowl 2) in which the competitive elements were eliminated by guaranteeing each 
participant a fixed harvest.
4  Subjects had to commit to harvesting from a single bowl for the 
entire round, but could switch between bowls in a subsequent round.  The instructions for this 
choice were as follows for the IHQ40 [IHQ80] treatment: 
“We will now divide the beans into two separate bowls. Before each round, you 
must decide the bowl from which you want to harvest. The amount of beans in 
each bowl will depend upon how many people choose to harvest from each bowl. 
The beans will be divided such that Bowl 1 always has 2½ [1¼] times as many 
                                                 
4  In the Chignik fishery that motivated the voluntary transition to IHQ treatment, at the start of each season 
fishermen were given the option of harvesting in the derby or the cooperative fishery.   15 
beans per person as Bowl 2. The rules for harvesting at each bowl are also 
different. In Bowl 1 the rules will be exactly the same as the previous stage [the 
Derby treatment]. The only differences may be the number of people harvesting 
from this bowl and the amount of beans in the bowl. In Bowl 2, the rules will be 
different. Each person who harvests from Bowl 2 will be assigned a personal 
harvest quota. If you choose to harvest from Bowl 2, your harvest is limited to 
your personal quota; you may not harvest more than your personal quota.”  
Each round, decisions about which bowl to harvest from were made simultaneously and in 
private.  Leaving the derby to harvest in the IHQ came at a cost in that there were always fewer 
beans per person available in the IHQ than in the derby. Let 
1 Q  denote the total quantity of beans 
in Bowl 1 (derby) and 
2 Q  denote the total quantity of beans in Bowl 2 (IHQ).  Let 
12 ,  nn  denote 
the number of subjects who chose to harvest from Bowls 1 and 2, respectively. Of 
course,
12 1 2 8 and  20 nn QQQ  .  In the IHQ80 treatment, the cost of switching was 
relatively low—the number of beans per person available in Bowl 2 was 80% of Bowl 1. That is, 
 
22 11 0.80 Qn Qn .  In the IHQ40 treatment, the cost of switching was high—the number 
of beans per person available in Bowl 2 was only 40% of Bowl 1:   
22 11 0.40. Qn Qn  
Table 2 summarizes, for each treatment, the availability of beans in each bowl for each potential 
combination of subjects choosing each bowl.  
The guaranteed harvest quantity in Bowl 2 depends upon the total number of harvesters 
who choose to switch (columns 6 and 10 in Table 1). With individual harvest (and therefore total 
revenue) guaranteed, there is no longer competition for a fixed resource stock and this is no 
longer a social dilemma. Instead, IHQ participants only need to decide which harvesting scoop to  16 
use. In this environment, the Nash equilibrium and efficient choices align, and each person 
should choose the smallest possible cup (1/8) to minimize costs.  
 
Sequences of Treatments 
There were three possible treatment sequences (A, B and C) shown in Table 3.  All three 
sequences began with a practice round that followed the rules for the Skill treatment. This was 
followed by 3 rounds of the Skill treatment and 4 rounds of the Derby treatment.  Hence, the first 
7 rounds were identical across all three sequences. Consistent with the policy problem of interest, 
this provides all subjects with experience in a competitive derby fishery before being given the 
opportunity to switch to an IHQ.   
For sequences A and B, in rounds 8-16 subjects were given the option to choose the bowl 
from which they would harvest.  Those who chose Bowl 1 continued to harvest following the 
rules of the derby.  Those who chose Bowl 2 were allowed to harvest the individual quota shown 
in columns 6 and 10 of Table 2.  In sequence C, subjects were not given a choice. They 
continued to harvest in a derby fishery through round 13.  The last 3 rounds of sequence C 
returned to the Skill rules (must use ¼ cup) to allow us to test whether those who harvested the 
most in rounds 1-3 were equally successful in rounds 14-16.  
 
RESULTS 
We begin our discussion of our experimental results by reviewing and comparing results for each 
treatment averaged across all sequences, rounds and subjects.  We then discuss, in turn, 
heterogeneity of subjects and estimation of relative skill; estimated production functions for 
competitive fisheries; and choices between competitive and quota fisheries 
  17 
Comparison of Results across Treatments 
Table 4 summarizes the results for each treatment, averaged across all sequences, rounds and 
subjects.  The top three rows of the table provide some benchmarks for evaluating outcomes: the 
maximum potential earnings or rents, calculated as maximum potential value minus minimum 
potential cost.  The next two rows summarize average group sizes (n) and scoop sizes (xit). 
 The following three rows show the calculation of actual average earnings or rents.  The last few 
rows of the table show average rent dissipation or the difference between maximum potential 
rent and observed average rent.  We distinguish between value-driven rent dissipation (the 
difference between maximum potential value and actual average value) and cost-driven rent 
dissipation (the difference between actual average costs and minimum potential costs).  
Consistent with naturally occurring derby fisheries, behavior in both the skill and derby 
treatments is highly competitive. The prohibition on verbal communication, combined with the 
speed with which the resource is exhausted (as little as 16 seconds), leaves little opportunity for 
subjects to coordinate choices.  In both the Skill and Derby treatments, although there were 2.5 
cups of beans per person in the common bowl, average value or deliveries per person are 
substantially below this (1.93 cups in Skill and 1.81 in the Derby).  The harvesting frenzy that 
emerges in these competitive fisheries causes participants to spill roughly one-quarter of the 
beans in each treatment rather than taking the time to empty the beans carefully into their 
pitchers.   This is an example of value-driven rent dissipation.  Because total deliveries are 
significantly less than the maximum potential value, the value that participants derive from 
harvesting the resource is less than would be possible if subjects handled the resource with 
greater care.    18 
Our observation of significant value-driven rent dissipation illustrates an important 
advantage of physically simulating the conditions of an actual fishery: it allows us to observe 
important but unanticipated effects.  In designing the experiment, our focus was on cost-driven 
rent dissipation.  We had not expected to observe value-driven rent dissipation and would not 
have observed it in a computer-based experiment using payoff tables. Moreover, this value-
driven rent dissipation through spillage is not an explicit choice; instead subjects typically 
described it as a necessary response to the real-time, competitive environment.
5  
In the Skill treatment, because there is no cost to harvesting, there is no cost-driven rent 
dissipation.  In contrast, in the Derby treatment, significant cost-driven rent dissipation occurs as 
subjects choose scoops with average size of 0.38 cups, well above the cost-minimizing size of 
1/8 cup.  The average gear cost is 1.66 cups, compared with the minimum potential cost of 0.55 
cups, resulting in average cost-driven rent dissipation of 1.11 cups, or 57% of total potential rent.   
Thus in the Derby treatment, the combination of value-driven rent dissipation (spills) and cost-
driven rent dissipation (larger-than-necessary cups) results in dissipation of almost all (92%) of 
potential rents. Alternatively, efficiency in the Derby was only 8%.  
  In the two IHQ treatments, there continues to be significant rent dissipation in Bowl 1 
(the derby).  The percent of beans spilled is similar to that observed in the Skill and Derby 
treatments—on average about one-quarter of the total quantity beans available winds up on the 
floor.  The experiments were parameterized using [2] such that, if all subjects were 
homogeneous, average scoops sizes and costs at Bowl 1 (derby) should increase in IHQ40 
relative to the Derby treatment, and decrease in IHQ80, but both would lead to higher earnings 
vis-à-vis the Derby treatment.  What we observe is a decrease in average scoop size for both 
                                                 
5 Note that while we are able to measure subjects’ collective value-driven rent dissipation (we measured total spills 
as the difference between the total harvested volume of beans and the total delivered volume of beans), we were 
unable to measure the volume of beans spilled by individual subjects, or individual value-driven rent dissipation.    19 
treatments, although the average scoop in IHQ80 is slightly smaller than IHQ40. In both IHQ 
treatments, those who voluntarily remain to harvest in a competitive derby earn more on average 
than in the Derby treatment when all subjects had to harvest competitively.   
Put differently, while there is significant rent dissipation in the competitive Bowl 1 for 
the both the IHQ40 and IHQ80 competitive treatments, there is considerably less rent dissipation 
than in the Derby treatment, and subjects earn significant positive rents.   It is an interesting 
question why those subjects who choose to fish competitively in Bowl 1 do not dissipate most of 
the potential additional rents from higher average allocations by increasing their scoop sizes.   
We may speculate as to several possible answers.  If some subjects initially continue with the 
same cup choices as during the Derby treatment, their profits will likely increase—providing less 
incentive to experiment with an alternative cup size.  Moreover, because they are competing with 
fewer other subjects, they may be less comfortable selecting a large cup size choice, and may 
recognize the risk of provoking a collective response of larger scoop size choices from other 
participants.    In any case, it is desirable that subjects choosing to fish competitively from Bowl 
1 should earn positive rents.  Recall that this is part of the logic of a voluntary transition scheme:  
to provide a “win-win option” so that those who prefer to fish competitively will not oppose 
giving those who wish to fish for a fixed quota the option to do so. 
As expected, in the quota fisheries of the two IHQ treatments, there is minimal rent 
dissipation.  When the competition for a fixed resource is removed, average scoop choices in 
Bowl 2 approach the smallest option (1/8 cup) and there is almost no spillage, leading to almost 
perfectly efficient outcomes. 
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Heterogeneity of Subjects and Estimation of Relative Skill 
The above discussion focuses on average cup choices, deliveries and earnings.  In the 
competitive treatments, these averages conceal significant differences among subjects in their 
cup choices, deliveries and earnings.
6  These differences are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows 
the distribution of individual earnings per period in the Derby treatment. Although there are 
instances in which subjects were able to earn over $1, this is uncommon relative to the frequency 
with which subjects were losing money.  In fact, total group earnings were negative in nearly 
one-third of the Derby treatment periods.   
In any period of the Derby treatment or Bowl 1 (derby) of the IHQ treatments, there are 
three potential explanations for differences in subject earnings:  (1) differences in cup choices; 
(2) differences in individual characteristics, which we refer to as relative skill, which persist 
across periods; and (3) random factors which are independent across periods.
 7   
We use the results of the Skill treatment to estimate individuals’ relative skill.  We define 
estimated relative skill as the ratio of the total quantity harvested by individual i in the three 
periods of the Skill treatment to the total quantity harvest by the entire group: 
38 3
11 1 ii t i t ti t RelativeSkill q q
    , where qit is the amount harvested by individual i in period 
t. Not surprisingly, Figure 2 shows that there is heterogeneity in estimated relative skill. The 
mean is 0.13 (=0.02), and ranges between 0.07 and 0.18.  This heterogeneity of estimated 
relative skill among subjects is not random as there is positive correlation between an 
                                                 
6 Although we were able to measure aggregate harvests and aggregate spills (the difference between total harvests 
and total deliveries), we were not able to measure individual harvests and individual spills—only individual 
deliveries.  
7 Note that we use the term “relative skill” rather than simply “skill” because the effects of these individual 
characteristics on an individual’s catch share and earnings depend in part on the characteristics of other subjects with 
whom the individual is competing.  A subject who is very good at scooping beans will do better if all the other 
subjects are not very good at scooping beans than if all the other subjects are as good or better at scooping beans.   21 
individual’s harvest shares among all periods of the Skill treatment.
8  Moreover, relative skill is 
robust across the start and end of the experiment. In sequence C, subjects participated in the Skill 
treatment in periods 1-3 and again in periods 14-16. The harvest shares for these two time 
segments are again positively correlated (0.60).  
 
Estimated Production Functions for Competitive Fisheries 
The estimated relative skill parameter is useful in estimating a simple production function for 
individual deliveries (qit).  Table 5 presents the estimation results for a linear random effects 
model of the form  it it i it qx v     for subject i, in periods  47 t   (i.e., the Derby 
treatment) ; the individual random effects are  ) , 0 ( ~
2
v i N v  , and  ) , 0 ( ~
2
   N it  is the 
idiosyncratic error term.  The positive and significant coefficient on estimated RelativeSkilli 
confirms that harvesting success in the Skill treatment carries over into the Derby and that this 
skill parameter successfully reflects subject heterogeneity.  In addition to RelativeSkilli, the other 
two dependent variables in the delivery production function are different measures of input 
choices:  xit  is the individual’s cup choice for harvesting, and  it it it
i
CapacityShare x x    is the 
individual’s cup size relative to the cup size choices of the entire group. As one might expect, all 
else equal a larger cup will yield a larger delivery (xit >0).  
Because the derby is a social dilemma, harvesting success depends not only on one’s own 
input choice, but also the input choice of the other group members.  The positive coefficient on 
CapacityShare shows that it is important to not only have a “large” harvesting capacity, but also 
to have a “large” harvesting capacity relative to the group members. This captures the essence of 
                                                 
8 The correlation in the individual share the total harvest between periods 1 and 2 is 0.69, between periods 2 and 3 is 
0.66, and between periods 1 and 3 is 0.60.  22 
the cost-driven rent dissipation problem or “keeping up with the Jones”—individuals in a derby 
compete by increasing their share of the total harvesting capacity until all the rents have been 
dissipated.   
In our environment, with a linear cost function and output price set at one, the difference 
in deliveries and earnings is simply the input cost,  ( ) 4.375 ii cx x  .  Because the cost of inputs is 
increasing, harvesting more does not necessarily translate to higher profits.  In fact, on average, 
the three largest cup sizes all have negative average earnings in the Derby treatment. 
 
Aggregate Choices Between Competitive and Quota Fisheries 
We turn next to experiment results related to subjects’ choices between competitive and quota 
fisheries in the two IHQ treatments, in which subjects are given the option of fishing 
competitively (Bowl 1) or in a quota fishery (Bowl 2).  We first discuss trends over time in the 
total number of subjects choosing each fishery.  We then discuss factors affecting which subjects 
choose each fishery. 
  Figure 3 shows the average number of subjects choosing the quota fishery in rounds 8-16 
of the IHQ80 and IHQ40 treatments.   Although all subjects would be better off on average if 
everyone were to switch to the quota fishery (Bowl 2), in both treatments at least some subjects 
choose to remain in the derby.  Fewer subjects switch to the quota fishery in IHQ40 due to the 
higher costs of switching (for any given number of quota harvesters, the individual quota per 
person in IHQ40 is less than IHQ80, see Table 2).   
Neither treatment has a discernible trend towards full adoption of the quota fishery over 
time.  Instead, on average the distribution of participants between the two fisheries appears  23 
relatively stable over time.  This would suggest that the derby fishery is not likely to be fully 
voluntarily phased out over time.   
One reason we might expect this is that under the allocation formula between the two 
fisheries, an “end-game” problem arises.  As can be seen in Table 2, as the number of subjects 
choosing the competitive fishery becomes smaller, the average allocation increases, giving 
subjects an increasing incentive to remain in or return to the competitive fishery.  There is never 
an incentive for the last subject to join the quota fishery:  as the sole participant in a 
“competitive” fishery he would in effect be fishing for a guaranteed but higher quota than in the 
quota fishery.   
We also observed that over the course of the IHQ80 and IHQ40 treatments, some 
subjects who had chosen the quota fishery subsequently switched back to the competitive fishery 
in later periods.  This suggests that the optimal choices for individual subjects are not necessarily 
obvious or stable.  Individual subjects’ expected catches in a competitive fishery depend in part 
on not only their own skill and cup choices, but also the relative skill and cup choices of the 
other subjects choosing the competitive fishery.  As subjects leave or enter the competitive 
fishery, they change the expected catches of the other subjects choosing the competitive fishery, 
and their optimal choices between fisheries.   
Figures 4 and 5 show that for both IHQ treatments, average earnings were higher in both 
the quota fishery (Bowl 2) and the competitive fishery (Bowl 1) than in the preceding Derby 
treatments.  This result lends support to an important premise of the rationale for voluntary 
transition: that it offers the opportunity to make both groups better off on average:  not only 
those who choose the quota fishery, but also those who choose the competitive fishery. 
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Individual Choices Between Competitive and Quota Fisheries 
We next examine factors affecting which individuals choose the competitive and quota fisheries.  
These same factors may also affect the extent to which individuals would oppose or support the 
mandatory imposition of a quota system.  As discussed above, in both our experimental 
environment and the naturally occurring derby fisheries of interest, there can be substantial 
heterogeneity among the harvesters.  This can manifest itself in individual choices between 
competitive and quota fisheries in a number of ways, which are not entirely independent.  First, 
those harvesters who are able to catch a relatively larger share of the fixed resource might be 
inclined to remain in the derby. This could be driven in part by the prestige associated with 
harvesting success, independent of profitability.  Some individuals may harvest less, but perhaps 
due to skill and lower input costs, are able to do so more profitably than those harvesting more. 
Whether these individuals switch to an individual quota depends upon whether the quota offers 
greater expected profits.  Finally, some individuals may simply enjoy the competitive nature of 
the derby.   
  In the experiments, subjects in Sequences A and B had the choice of remaining in the 
derby or voluntarily switching to a non-transferable individual harvest quota. There are at least 
three observable sources of heterogeneity which could affect this choice: relative skill, derby 
earnings, and derby harvests.  We use a random effects logit model (with the panel defined over 
the individual) to estimate the individual decision about whether to switch to the individual 
harvest quota (subjects made this decision at the start of each period). In Table 6, the dependent 
variable, IHQit, equals 1 when the subject chooses the individual quota (bowl 2) and 0 when the 
subject harvests in the derby (bowl 1). 
78 7
41 4 ii t i t ti t DerbyEarningsShare  
     is the  25 
total amount earned by an individual during the Derby treatment as a share of total earnings by 
the group; DerbyHarvestSharei is defined similarly, using xit rather than it.   
  The results in Table 6 indicate that those with more skill and those who harvested more 
are less likely to switch to the individual quota.  We hypothetized that those who earned the most 
in the derby might be less likely to switch to the quota, but estimation results suggest that relative 
earnings in the derby do not have a significant effect. This also suggests that skilled harvesters 
may be more likely to oppose implementation of a mandatory quota system, particularly one 
with equal quota shares as in these experiments, because they are generally able to harvest a 
larger share of the resource in the competitive derby environment. This skill advantage has no 
value with the individual quota.
9   
  In addition, those who were able to harvest relatively more in the derby (this could be due 
to skill or choice of cup size) may be reluctant to switch in the expectation that their harvesting 
success will continue. A large harvest alone does not necessarily translate into success in the 
derby—the individual must also make a smart choice of cup size to ensure profitability.  The 
results in Table 6 show that relative earnings in the derby are not a significant factor in the 
decision to switch to the IHQ.  The estimation results show that an individual’s willingness to 
switch will depend upon how much it “costs” to leave the derby. Recall that, unless everyone 
switches to the IHQ, there will always be more beans per person in the derby (see Table 2).  The 
costs of switching are greater in the IHQ40 treatment, hence individuals are less likely to switch 
than in the IHQ80 treatment. This is shown in Figure 3, and in the negative coefficient on IHQ40 
in Table 6. 
                                                 
9 The primary return to skill would be if the quota were allocated based on historical catch in the derby.   26 
It is not necessarily the case that everyone is “losing” money in the derby even if rents 
are dissipated in aggregate.  More importantly, our results show that not everyone will 
voluntarily switch to the IHQ when given a chance—and this decision to remain in the derby is 
not entirely irrational.  When the costs of switching are low (IHQ80), Figure 5 shows that 
average derby earnings (Bowl 1) are lower than in the quota (Bowl 2), although the earnings 
difference is smaller in the later periods. More importantly, when the costs of switching are high 
(IHQ40), Figure 4 shows that those in the derby actually earn more on average than those who 




This paper presents the results of a unique experiment that, in essence, brings the field into the 
lab. The hands-on approach provides a simple and more natural experience for subjects and may 
be particularly amenable to field situations in which education and literacy might affect a 
subject’s ability to understand the experiment. The experimental results for the competitive 
treatments help to confirm and illustrate basic but important points about rent dissipation in 
competitive fisheries, as well as the political economics of changes to fisheries management.  
Key results include: 
  Significant rent dissipation may occur in competitive fisheries, but not all rents are 
necessarily dissipated. 
  Competitive fisheries may exhibit both cost-driven and value-driven rent dissipation. 
  Fishermen may be heterogeneous with respect to fishing skill, which may in turn affect 
their optimal gear choices in a competitive fishery.  27 
  Heterogeneity of both fishing skill and gear choices may contribute to heterogeneity of 
harvests and earnings.  The fact that fishermen may be earning low rents on average does 
not necessarily mean that all fishermen are earning low rents, or stand to benefit equally 
from management changes.   
Theory, experimental evidence and practical experience all suggest that offering fishermen a 
choice between participating in a rights-based fishery and continuing to fish competitively may 
be an effective approach to facilitate transition to rights-based fishing. Voluntary transitions may 
become a “win-win” approach under which both groups become better off.  
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a Scoop Cost = 4.375  Scoop Size 
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Table 2. Availability of beans in each bowl in IHQ treatments 
         IHQ80     IHQ40 
Number of  





























8  0   20.0 0.0  2.5  --   20.0 0.0  2.5  -- 
7  1   17.9 2.1  2.6  2.1    18.9 1.1  2.7  1.1 
6  2   15.8 4.2  2.6  2.1    17.6 2.4  2.9  1.2 
5  3   13.5 6.5  2.7  2.2    16.1 3.9  3.2  1.3 
4  4   11.1 8.9  2.8  2.2    14.3 5.7  3.6  1.4 
3  5   8.6  11.4  2.9  2.3   12.0  8.0  4.0  1.6 
2  6   5.9 14.1 2.9  2.4    9.1 10.9 4.6  1.8 
1  7   3.0 17.0 3.0  2.4    5.3 14.7 5.3  2.1 
0  8     0.0  20.0  --  2.5   0.0  20.0  --  2.5 
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Table 3. Sequence of Treatments 
 
  ROUND 
Sequence  Practice  1  2  3  4  567891 01 11 21 31 4  1 5  1 6  
A  Skill  Skill Derby  IHQ40 
B  Skill  Skill Derby  IHQ80 
C  Skill  Skill Derby  Skill 
  32 
Table 4. Experiment Summary Statistics (per person per round) 
 
Treatment Skill   Derby  IHQ40   IHQ80   IHQ40   IHQ80 
Bowl  1 1 1 1 2 2 
Type of fishery  Competitive Competitive Competitive Competitive Quota  Quota 
Benchmarks                   
Maximum potential value
a  2.50   2.50  3.32 (0.54) 2.89  (0.09) 1.42 (0.22)  2.33 (0.07) 
Minimum  potential  cost  0.00   0.55  0.55  0.55   0.55  0.55  
Maximum potential rent
a 2.50   1.95  2.77  2.34   0.87  1.78  
                   
Observed                   
Average  group  size  8.0   8.0   5.0   2.6   3.0   5.4  
Average scoop size  0.25  (0)  0.38 (0.25) 0.31 (0.09) 0.27  (0.15) 0.13 (0.05)  0.13 (0.07) 
                   
Average value (deliveries)  1.93  (0.47)   1.81 (0.92)   2.41 (0.67)   2.17 (0.74)   1.42 (0.22)    2.33 (0.07) 
Average costs  0      1.66 (1.11)   1.37 (0.37)   1.17 (0.66)   0.58 (0.22)    0.59 (0.32) 
Average rent  1.93  (0.47)   0.15 (0.68)   1.04 (0.56)   1.00 (0.78)   0.84 (0.29)    1.74 (0.34) 
                              
Rent dissipation                   
Value-driven  (avg)  0.57   0.69  0.91  0.72   0.00  0.00  
Cost-driven  (avg)  0.00   1.11  0.82  0.62   0.03  0.03  
Total  (avg)  0.57   1.80  1.73  1.34   0.03  0.03  
                   
Rent dissipation as a share of maximum potential rent             
Value-driven  (avg)  23%   35%  33%  31%    0%    0%   
Cost-driven  (avg)  0%   57%  30%  27%    4%    2%   
Total (avg)  23%       92%      63%      58%       4%       2%    
a Maximum potential value and earnings varies each period in IHQ treatments based on number of subjects choosing each bowl. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Harvest (qit)  
xit  0.93 
(0.16) 
*** 
CapacityShareit  7.99 
(0.60) 
*** 







2 0.76   
Wald 
2(3)  1221.1  
p  0.00  
Includes data from all sessions for the derby in periods 4-7. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p    0.10; ** p  0.05; *** p  0.01.  34 






RelativeSkilli  –24.40 
(14.49) 
* 
DerbyHarvestSharei  –19.32 
(7.51) 
*** 
DerbyEarningsSharei  0.70 
(0.45) 
 







2(4)  31.58  
p  0.00  
Includes Sequences A and B only, periods 8-16. Standard errors in parentheses. * p    0.10; ** p 
 0.05; *** p  0.01. 35 
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